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Abstract
Mobile money is a financial innovation that provides transfers, payments, and other financial services
at a low or zero cost to individuals in developing countries where banking and capital markets are de-
ficient and financial inclusion is low. We use transaction costs and institutional theories to explain the
growth and impact of mobile money. Having developed a new archival dataset that tracks mobile
money deployment across 90 emerging economies during 16 years between 2000 and 2015, we ad-
dress the question of relative economic impact of the banking and telecoms sectors in the provision
of mobile money. We show that telecom groups and not banks are more likely to launch mobile
money in countries where legal rights are weaker and credit information less prevalent. However, it is
when mobile money is offered via a banking channel that the spillover effects on the economy are
greater. Findings have significant implications for policy and strategy.
JEL classification: F63, G21, M13, O33
1. Introduction
People in developed economies usually have access to financial services via a variety of institutions, through which
they securely spend or save money. Indeed, access to financial services is an important institutional foundation to the
efficient functioning of the market economy (North, 1990; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1992). However, in developing
economies, institutional barriers significantly raise the cost of providing financial services (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001;
Khanna and Palepu, 2006, 2010; Mair and Marti, 2009). One important consequence is that approximately half of
the population in developing economies is not integrated into the financial system and are “financially excluded”
(Beck et al., 2008; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2018). When people are financially excluded, they cannot easily or cheaply
smooth their income and spending over time, rendering them vulnerable to market shocks or personal dislocations
(Collins et al., 2009). Moreover, those living in poverty feel the impact disproportionately. Historically, providing fi-
nancial services to this population created higher levels of risk and greater information asymmetries for financial
institutions (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). Therefore, people excluded from financial services have had to dispropor-
tionately rely on cash. Money, and particularly cash, is less efficient, costlier to store, and more dangerous to trans-
port for individuals than for financial institutions (Keynes, 1930; Prahalad, 2006). Moreover, those excluded from
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the financial system use costly informal financial alternatives provided by moneylenders or make physical cash trans-
fers to undertake transactions over space and time (Besley, 1995, Beck et al., 2009).
Recently, this situation has begun to change (Goedhuys, 2007; Jack and Suri, 2014; Suri, 2017). The evolution of in-
formation and communication technology (Aboal and Tacsir, 2018) has led to the provision of mobile money: a poten-
tially transformational innovation that offers low cost transfers, payments, and financial services (Aron, 2015; Dodgson
et al., 2015). Mobile money products have put financial services onto mobile phones and hence into the hands of a
much wider segment of the population (Jack and Suri, 2011). As a result, mobile money diffused widely across develop-
ing economies over the last 10years. The best known of these, M-Pesa, was introduced into Kenya by Safaricom in
2007, and by 2011 was processing more transactions domestically than Western Union did globally (IMF, 2011: 50).
M-Pesa offered a cheap and efficient way to transfer money and to make payments, especially for workers who had to
send home remittances. Its large networks of agents make payment facilities accessible to more than 90% of Kenya’s
adult population. Similarly, in the Philippines, mobile money was introduced through the entry of SMART-Money in
2000 and Globe Telecom, which in 2004 offered G-Cash. In 2016, mobile money services were offered in 90 emerging
countries, with 500 million accounts leading to 43 million transactions per day (GSMA, 2017a).
However, high transaction costs still permeate most economic exchanges in developing countries (Khanna and
Palepu, 2006; Khanna and Yafeh, 2007; Fainshmidt et al., 2016) notably in the financial services sector (Khanna and
Rivkin, 2001; Khanna and Palepu, 2010; Khavul, 2010). Hence, the introduction and spread of mobile money may
create new commercial opportunities and increase the convenience and security of transactions (Mbiti and Weil,
2013). In addition, the use of mobile money may facilitate the integration of economic activities from the informal to
the formal financial system, which may result in further positive spillover benefits for broader economic growth
(Levine, 1997; Raj, 2015).
In fact, despite the potential significance of this innovation, our understanding of the forces driving the successful
launch of mobile money remains preliminary (Duncombe and Boateng, 2009; Dodgson et al., 2015). For the most part,
the literature has concentrated on excellent but single country studies about user adoption or specific regulatory or insti-
tutional issues in important but isolated geographies (Porteous, 2006; Hughes and Lonie, 2007; Chatain et al., 2008;
Jack and Suri, 2011, 2014; Mbiti and Weil, 2013). Thus, as yet, there are few studies that examine in depth the factors
explaining the spread of mobile money or the form that the diffusion takes in different institutional contexts (Boor
et al., 2014). Moreover, though the literature has considered the impact of mobile money on financial inclusion (Klein
and Meyer, 2011; Dermish et al., 2012; Suri and Jack, 2016), the broader impact of this innovation on the development
process, and its conditionality on the forms that mobile money has taken, remains to be explored.
Therefore, in this article, we deepen the analysis of mobile money by considering for the first time how firms com-
pete to introduce and diffuse mobile money. We focus primarily on the differences between firms in the international
telecommunications (telcos) and banking (banks) sectors across a wide variety of countries. We develop hypotheses
about the relationships between the different business approaches of banks and telcos to mobile money and the
resulting heterogeneity in the diffusion process. We test these ideas using a new dataset we have constructed; a novel
panel that captures the provision of mobile money by nearly 259 firms across 90 emerging economies during the 16-
year period between 2000 and 2015.
We focus on two related research questions. First, what explains the introduction and diffusion of mobile money?
Mobile money is typically associated with lower levels of economic development, but there is considerable heterogen-
eity in its prevalence and form across countries (Bamberger and Ang, 2016). This leads us to consider whether firms
from the banking or the telecommunications sector are better able to address the institutional complexities of finan-
cial innovation in developing countries, and how the relative advantages and disadvantages of each are contingent on
the institutional and policy context. Second, we explore how the spread of these different models for mobile money
affects the generation of economic spillovers, in terms of volume and frequency of financial transactions in the local
economy. That is, in the provision of mobile money systems, are the spillover effects on national economic perform-
ance contingent on whether banks or telecoms companies drive the innovation?
Unlike mobile telephony, which has gradually diffused starting in developed economies and increasingly through-
out the world (GSMA, 2017b), mobile money services were initially introduced in OECD countries, then closed, and
have since taken decades to revive (GSMA, 2017a). However, mobile money is much more common in many, though
not all, developing economies, especially in Africa (Linklaters, 2017) and parts of South East Asia and Latin America
(Aron, 2015) where there is considerable country-specific heterogeneity in the form and quality of institutions (Estrin
et al., 2019). Moreover, the channel through which mobile money is provided also varies greatly from country to
2 A. Pelletier et al.
D
o
w
n
lo
a
d
e
d
 fro
m
 h
ttp
s
://a
c
a
d
e
m
ic
.o
u
p
.c
o
m
/ic
c
/a
d
v
a
n
c
e
-a
rtic
le
-a
b
s
tra
c
t/d
o
i/1
0
.1
0
9
3
/ic
c
/d
tz
0
4
9
/5
5
6
6
3
8
1
 b
y
 L
o
n
d
o
n
 S
c
h
o
o
l o
f E
c
o
n
o
m
ic
s
 u
s
e
r o
n
 1
0
 S
e
p
te
m
b
e
r 2
0
1
9
country (Camner, 2012) and as a result, mobile money is positioned at a complex sectoral and regulatory interface
between the telecommunication and banking sectors (Porteous, 2006; di Castri, 2013). In some places, like Kenya
(Jack and Suri, 2014), Tanzania, Brazil, or Iran, the dominant service provider is a telecommunication company (tele-
coms); in others like Bangladesh, Nigeria, or Argentina, it is a bank. In a few places, like India and South Africa,
both co-exist and share the market (GSMA, 2017b). While regulatory arrangements are surely relevant (Klein and
Meyer, 2011), we argue that it is also very important to understand what systematic national characteristics, for ex-
ample level of development, infrastructure, institutions, or geography, are driving country-level heterogeneity in the
channel of mobile money provision across the two sectors. Moreover, we explicitly consider how the existing and
evolving capabilities of banks and telecoms foster the introduction and adoption of mobile money.
Our second research question concerns the economic impact of the mobile money phenomenon. It is widely
argued that the evolution of the financial sector is key to development because it accelerates and stabilizes the process
of national economic growth (Levine, 1997; Beck et al., 2009). Mobile money could be particularly significant in this
respect because it reduces the transactions costs of engaging in the market economy and given that it engages a large
number of businesses and consumers who were previously excluded or marginalized by their reliance on cash and
their limited liquidity. The development policy literature has also placed emphasis on mobile money as a tool to fa-
cilitate financial inclusion and thereby to reduce poverty and inequality (Jack and Suri, 2011; Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al.,
2015, 2018; Raj, 2015).
We establish that systematic national characteristics do in fact play a significant role in determining whether tele-
com groups or banks are the main providers of mobile money in different countries. By exploiting their existing net-
work of agents, telecom groups reach the new market opened up by the lower transactions costs of this technology
more cheaply, often bringing into the system hitherto financially excluded individuals and firms. In contrast, banks
need to build up a new structure of agents and may face greater levels of regulation. Thus, we show that telecom
groups, rather than banks, are more likely to launch mobile money in countries where legal rights are weaker and
credit information is less prevalent. However, we have also found that mobile money systems based on banks may
have a greater impact on economic development than those based on telecom groups, because banks offer a wider
range of products and their activities can stimulate a money multiplier.
To begin, we examine theoretically the diffusion and impact of mobile money (Section 2). We then introduce our
dataset and methodology (Section 3) before presenting our results (Section 4) and concluding with policy implication
(Section 5).
2. The spread and impact of mobile money: the competing capabilities of banks and
telecoms
Prior to the introduction of mobile money in developing economies, the transaction costs of both delivering and using
financial services was high (Jack and Suri, 2011; Mas and Klein, 2012; Weil et al., 2012). The economics literature
has stressed the impact of high costs of coordination between individuals, between firms, their suppliers as well as
buyers. In addition, the leakage costs of undertaking transactions can be attributed to corruption and reliance on
middlemen and the informal system of money transfers that are costly, and insecure (Aron, 2015, 2018), and expose
individuals and firms to significantly higher risks of outright theft or extortion.
Traditional branch banking business in developing countries had limited reach and lacked the dynamic capabil-
ities to change. Indeed, the geographic and population coverage of bank networks was concentrated in a few large
cities and served individuals of high net worth or formal businesses (Claessens, 2006; Beck et al., 2008; De Castro
et al., 2014). This was largely because the costs of creating and running a branch-based banking network rise consid-
erably as population density falls or in countries where the proportion of the population living in urban areas is rela-
tively low, as is common in developing economies (Mills and Tan, 1980). Moreover, high transactions costs have
meant that banks have found it difficult to offer services that are profitable to the bulk of the population in develop-
ing countries, in part because of the low savings rate of low-income populations (Prahalad, 2006; Banerjee and
Duflo, 2011). The banking network therefore provided only partial coverage by population and geography, fore-
going significant potential positive network externalities. Banks had well-entrenched organizational capabilities
focused on delivering financial services to narrow segments of the population. These ordinary capabilities conformed
to existing business models and largely performed their intended function (Helfat and Winter, 2011; Teece, 2019).
Initially, they did not seek opportunities to develop dynamic capabilities that would allow them to identify the needs
Innovations in emerging markets 3
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of a different group of customers nor mobilize resources in order to capture value from the emerging mobile money
innovation. In many countries, banks put up a significant resistance to the introduction and diffusion of mobile
money systems. They were not ready for the transformational change this would entail (Teece, 2018, 2019).
The initial opportunity to introduce mobile money to a larger population did not come through established local
banks or the financial sector but rather through the entry of international telecommunication firms. The core capabil-
ities of telcos differ from those of banks and the incentives for exploiting the new mobile moneys technology created
radically different consequences from the point of view of transactions costs in their business models (Teece, 2010,
2019). The difference becomes apparent when we analyze value creation and value capture. Specifically, value cre-
ation reflects how banks and telcos engage with customers and value capture, how they monetized value (Baden-
Fuller and Haefliger, 2013: 420).
For banking groups, undertaking the provision of mobile money services conflicts with the established capabilities
of the traditional banking business model, which is based upon intermediation and interest margin profits with the
former established typically in developed economies through a local branch structure.1 The firm capabilities required
for this model differ from those associated with the provision of mobile money because mobile money transfers are a
high volume, low value transaction business. Telcos, on the other hand, are better positioned from the outset for the
provision of mobile money. As Donovan (2014: 2) points out, “telecommunications is transaction based, meaning
revenue comes from a fee on each transaction; banks are float based, earning money through holding deposits.” For
this reason, small transfers are easier to monetize by firms in the telecom, rather than banking sector. For mobile
operators in developing countries, their usage-based revenue model implies that each transaction is profitable on a
stand-alone basis. In contrast, customers in developing markets represent relatively high operating costs for banks, in
terms of monitoring their banking activities, compared to the revenues that can be generated from reinvesting the
small value of their deposits. In addition, banks have traditionally adopted a “brick and mortar” approach, setting
up branches to serve local customers, which is costly in countries with sparsely populated rural areas, thus limiting
their outreach. This approach limits banks’ ability to detect opportunities and capture value in the mobile money
space. In addition, banking regulation, in particular anti-money-laundering, “know-your–customer,” rules, constrain
banks’ appetite and ability to deal with risks. We argue that this is especially true in economies in which missing insti-
tutions weaken capital market development. Even so, regulatory authorities may sometimes favor banks over telcos
in mobile money provision. In the next section, we argue that missing institutions create different environmental con-
ditions and incentives for entry and provision of mobile money by international banks and telecoms groups.
2.1 Innovation, transactions costs, and weak institutions
As we have noted, the constraints on the provision of financial services primarily bind in developing countries; how-
ever, developing countries are not homogeneous in their institutional contexts (Wright et al., 2005; Estrin et al.,
2019). The transactions cost approach to this issue is referred to as the missing institutions (institutional voids). This
literature analyzes the gaps in market-supporting infrastructure that can limit or prevent the arms-length contracting
underpinning market transactions (Khanna and Palepu, 2006; Khanna and Yafeh, 2007; Gao et al., 2017). Missing
institutions are particularly prevalent in the financial services sector because of the high risks and asymmetries of in-
formation that require complex contractual arrangements and effective enforcement (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001).
Our hypothesis in this section concerns the ways that missing institutions affect differentially the way that transac-
tions costs for financial services change because of the provision of mobile money when undertaken by banks or by
telecommunication providers.
Consider the impact of institutional environments on the relative transactions costs of introducing mobile money
for firms in these two sectors. Banking relies on standardized processes primarily operating through a branch net-
work to evaluate lending risks, combined with a significant degree of collateralization via the borrower’s assets to
limit losses in the case of default. Indeed, banks are regulated closely to ensure that they evaluate carefully the risks
within their own portfolio and maintain adequate liquidity for their risk profile. When banks enter overseas jurisdic-
tions, they have to examine closely the impact of the new legal systems on their risk profile and their capital adequacy
ratios. Weak protection of legal rights or ineffective enforcement of contracts raises their risks, leading them to hold
more liquidity, which increases the costs of doing business and reduces profitability. Such risks are further raised
1 Banks are now increasingly diversifying into web-based provision, but that is not in the remit of this article.
4 A. Pelletier et al.
D
o
w
n
lo
a
d
e
d
 fro
m
 h
ttp
s
://a
c
a
d
e
m
ic
.o
u
p
.c
o
m
/ic
c
/a
d
v
a
n
c
e
-a
rtic
le
-a
b
s
tra
c
t/d
o
i/1
0
.1
0
9
3
/ic
c
/d
tz
0
4
9
/5
5
6
6
3
8
1
 b
y
 L
o
n
d
o
n
 S
c
h
o
o
l o
f E
c
o
n
o
m
ic
s
 u
s
e
r o
n
 1
0
 S
e
p
te
m
b
e
r 2
0
1
9
when we consider innovations such as mobile money services, especially in situations where loans are available
through the mobile provider, because the standard mechanisms of risk assessment cannot be applied.
Hence, banking groups considering the introduction of mobile money face three fundamental issues. The first is
the impact of institutional voids on risk assessment and Know Your Customer (KYC) requirements might generate
costs that more than offset the benefits from market growth because the costs of screening customers are raised. The
second relates to regulation, because any additional business generated is subject to the same regulatory scrutiny as
their other, higher margin, lower volume activities. Finally, banks rely on expanding business to spread around the
large fixed costs of their branch network and rely on high margins or commissions rather than low margins but high
volume of transactions.
By contrast, telecoms groups do not face such costly barriers to entry, because their infrastructure is different,
benefitting from a pre-existing airtime distribution network which is directly linked to the development of mobile
money, and because missing institutions do not create such insurmountable hurdles for them. Telecoms groups do
not fall under banking regulations and in countries where they are allowed to offer mobile money and transfer serv-
ices, although they may be regulated by specific mobile money directives or regulations, these are less demanding
than full banking licenses, especially in terms of KYC requirements (Pelletier et al., 2019). In addition, the type of fi-
nancial service that they can offer is generally limited to transfer and payments. This limits both the risk of default
(“bank runs”) and the risk of financial contagion via other banking products is limited. Consequently, the additional
risks to the revenue base of telecom groups posed by missing institutions, such as weaker legal rights, are much less
than for banks. In fact, in the provision of mobile money services, the risks of fraud or payment uncertainty are auto-
matically constrained because telecom groups can monetize value based on transaction fees that are charged to the
customer at the time of the exchange. Low depth of credit information is also not a deterrent for telecom groups who
often count as telecommunication customers those without formal credit histories well ahead of creating value for
them with mobile money services. As such, they already have “telecommunication” information on these registered
mobile phones customers. Specifically, in many developing economies, those who live in poverty purchase mobile
telecommunication services on a pay as you go basis by using prepaid cards. Furthermore, by tracking the purchase
histories of telecommunication customers and tying these to specific phones, telecom groups over time can create
meaningful profiles of millions of their customers. Such information can complement or substitute for low depth of
credit information, the standardized information underlying banking procedures. Telecom groups rather than bank-
ing groups can therefore compensate with internal structures for the lack of credit information because they create
value for the mobile customer through their core telecommunication services. Thus, we predict:
H1: Telecoms groups are significantly more likely than banking groups to set up mobile money services in countries where insti-
tutions are weaker.
2.2 The impact of mobile money in developing economies: spillovers and sectoral effects
2.2.1 The transactions and savings effects
We have seen that the institutional context combines with sector-specific business capabilities to generate different
incentives for banks and telcos in the introduction of mobile money. This difference concerns the private returns to
the companies involved in bringing the innovation to market. However, mobile money may also have a broader eco-
nomic impact that, even if not captured by the providers, can improve the economic performance of the host coun-
tries (Meyer and Sinani, 2009). We therefore now analyze the mechanisms driving these spillovers; in particular, how
differences between firms in the banking and telco sectors lead the external benefits from the introduction of mobile
money to differ according to which introduces mobile money.
Money has long been understood to play a special role in the economy. It is sought not as a good in its own right
but as a facilitator of market transactions (Keynes, 1923). This characteristic also applies to mobile money. Allen
(1999) points out that there are costs resulting from the transfer of property rights between firms or individuals from
the process of market exchange. When the returns from buying and selling capital assets are small, relative to the
costs of trading goods, individuals will hold cash balances, even though they yield zero return (Hicks, 1935). In other
words, frictions in the economy determine the demand for money and these “costs of trading” (Demsetz, 1964) are
contingent on the transaction technology (Pesaran and Timmermann, 1994; Jouini and Kallal, 1995). High costs of
Innovations in emerging markets 5
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trading increase the demand for money, while improvements in transactions technology reduce it. When a techno-
logical advance lowers the demand for money, the given money stock, determined by the central bank, can in prin-
ciple be used more intensively to facilitate economic transactions. This is referred to as increasing the velocity of
money. This process of increasing the demand for money therefore provides an economy-wide external benefits
through what is, in effect, an injection of liquidity; the so-called “transactions effect” (Thornton, 1983).2
However, there may be also a countervailing spillover effect through the impact on savings; the “savings effect.”
Thus, in addition to facilitating transactions, mobile money may also provide a safe way for people to save, and
thereby facilitate and encourage individuals and businesses to save. Under this countervailing effect, if the share of a
given stock of money used for savings is increased, the amount left for transactions is reduced and so the velocity of
money will fall. This will have a dampening effect on the economy. The net effect of mobile money on the broader
economy depends on the balance of these two effects. If mobile money is primarily used as a way to save, the positive
spillover benefits on GDP via the transactions effect could be reduced or even eliminated.3
The empirical evidence to date about the balance of these two effects is based on single country studies and identi-
fies an increase in both the propensity to transact and to save (Jack and Suri, 2011; Mbiti and Weil, 2011; Blauw and
Franses, 2016; Kochar, 2018; Riley, 2018). For example, Jack and Suri (2011) find that M-Pesa users sent and
received remittances more frequently than nonusers and were more likely to use a bank account to save.
Furthermore, M-Pesa users who own a bank account are much more likely to save using M-Pesa than those who do
not. Mbiti and Weil (2011), using data from two waves of individual surveys on financial access in Kenya (Finaccess
survey4), have similar findings, namely that increased use of M-Pesa lowered the propensity of people to use informal
savings mechanisms, and raised the probability of being banked.
Since the transactions and savings effects have the opposite impact, it is important to consider which will predom-
inate. In the context of developing economies, with initially low levels of financial development and personal savings
and high numbers of informal transfers (remittances transferred informally, and in-kind type of remittances), the
transaction effect seems likely to predominate. This judgement is reinforced by the fact that there are relatively low
limits on the account size within mobile money, which effectively places a cap on mobile savings. In addition, the pre-
dominance of the transaction effect may be particularly marked if the alternatives to mobile transactions are less at-
tractive than the alternatives to mobile savings. In practice, while there are few alternatives to mobile transactions
for the financially excluded, there are many alternatives for private savings such as Rotating Savings and Credit
Association, gold or cattle. Hence, we propose:
H2: An increase in the number of mobile money services in an economy leads to an increase in the total value of transactions in
that economy.
2.2.2 Spillovers from mobile money by banks and telcos
Telcos are often limited in their product offers by the fact that they do not have a banking license while banking
groups, which traditionally rely on cross selling through their branch network, are able to offer a larger range of mo-
bile money services than can telecom companies (loans, insurance, etc.). Of course, some of these additional services
will generate a savings effect but in practice, the wider product range is related to more differentiated transactions
products and as such stimulates a positive transactions effect on GDP.
There is a second mechanism by which banking and telecom groups may differ in terms of the spillovers they gen-
erate, which operates via their differential impacts on the supply of money. It is generally required by national regula-
tions that nonbank mobile money providers maintain liquid assets equal in value to the amount of money issued
electronically. Hence, any money that goes through the mobile money system must be backed 100% by the pooled
account (di Castri, 2013). This must be held, ring-fenced, in an account at a fully prudentially regulated institution.
2 In contrast, innovations that lower the cost of holding money, relative to nonmonetary assets should have the converse
effect, reducing the frequency of transactions; an hypothesis confirmed by Bordo and Jonung (1987, 1990).
3 As an example of the two effects, Mbiti and Weil (2013) have shown that in Kenya, some users are keeping their cash
on phones for significantly longer than 1 week. A simple deposit-transfer-withdraw transaction might involve e-money
being created (in the sense that it is transferred from an agent to a customer), transferred, and extinguished (trans-
ferred back to an agent’s phone) in much less than a day.
4 http://fsdkenya.org/finaccess/
6 A. Pelletier et al.
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Therefore, telecom mobile money providers are not able to create additional money through intermediation, namely
by expanding their volume of loans in an economy based on the deposits that they have accepted.5 This contrasts
with banks, which are only required through regulation to keep a relatively small proportion of their overall deposits
in liquid form. Instead, they are allowed to use the remainder of their deposits to expand their loan portfolio, the so-
called “money multiplier.” Thus, banks are able to create new money based on mobile money deposits while telecom
groups cannot.6 We therefore hypothesize that bank-led providers will have a greater impact on economic transac-
tions than telecom-led providers, both through the larger variety of products they offer and through their ability to
on-lend deposits.
H3. The positive spillover effects from the number of mobile money services to the economy are more pronounced for services
launched by banking groups than for those launched by telecom groups.
3. Data and methods
3.1 Data
We have drawn on multiple sources to construct a unique archival dataset about the prevalence of mobile money.
The resulting panel data covers 90 developing economies containing 259 providers over 16 years, 2000–2015. The
database was constructed by combining information from Global System for Mobile Communication Association
(GSMA) (www.gsma.com),7 ownership information on the companies providing mobile money services derived
from the Orbis database, and national economic and institutional data. The GSMAMobile money for the Unbanked
Deployment Tracker (MMU) monitors the number of live and planned mobile money services in developing coun-
tries and contains information on both foreign-owned and domestic organizations which have launched a mobile
money service, the launch date of the service, the products offered,8 and the company partners (technology partners,
bank partners, Western Union, etc.). We use ownership information from Orbis to separate mobile money providers
into two categories, firms ultimately owned by a banking group or by a telecom group. We also identify a third cat-
egory, firms owned by independent mobile money providers.9 Our analysis above suggested that telcos may have
advantages in introducing mobile money and there is evidence for this in the data. Thus, we can see from Figure 1
that telecom providers are the larger player on the mobile money market globally; in our sample, 59% of mobile
money services are provided by telcos, 23% by banking groups, and 18% by third party providers. Pelletier et al.
(2019) argue that fast penetration of mobile phone technology, limited prior access to formal banking services, and
significant flows of money transfers such as workers’ remittances facilitated the spread of mobile money services in
countries with low levels of development and with a relatively large population. They also provide further descriptive
information about the factors associated with mobile money prevalence, the choice of banking or telco as provider
and the services offered. To examine the impact of contextual factors empirically, we collected a large variety of data
about economic and institutional conditions in the 90 countries of our sample from the IMF (World Economic
Outlook and IMF International Financial Statistics), the World Bank (World Development Indicators), and the
Heritage Foundation (Economic Freedom indicators).
3.2 Data and model specification and methodology for mobile money provision model
In our approach, we consider how heterogeneity in institutional quality affects the spread and impact of mobile money.
Hypothesis 1 explores the way that the variation in institutional contexts might differentially affect the diffusion of
5 The exception is when they partner with banks to offer mobile loans such as the MShwari loan products, which is
offered through a partnership between CBA Bank and MPesa in Kenya.
6 To the extent that they are required to deposit customers’ funds in a bank however, the value stored as e-money will
lead to money creation if this bank then provides loans to borrowers with the deposits they have accepted (di Castri,
2013).
7 Through its MMU; http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/programmes/mobile-money-for-the-unbanked/insights/
tracker
8 These include: air time top up, bill payment, p2p transfer domestic, other bulk payment; merchant payment, product g2p,
mobile microinsurance, international remittances, loan disbursement/repayment, and link to other banking products.
9 For instance, Zoona in Zambia, Afrimarket in Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire, Benin, and Togo.
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mobile money contingent on whether the firm is in the banking or telecommunications sector. Given that we want to
understand how institutional contexts affect mobile money provision, the appropriate sample for testing hypothesis 1 is
the set of firms that make choices about (country) entry and mobile money provision dependent on institutional context;
this is the foreign banks and telcos. Specifically, we model the impact of institutions of on mobile money provision by
analyzing the choice of location by each bank or telco for mobile money services across countries, each representing a
different institutional alternative context.10 We also distinguish between the decision of a bank or telecom operator to
enter a particular country and their subsequent choice to launch a mobile money service in that location. These two
decisions are not necessarily explained by the same factors, and therefore not all banks and mobile operators offer mo-
bile money. For example, a bank may enter a country which has close historic or economic links to the home economy,
but be motivated subsequently to offer mobile money because, for example, of a booming market in migrant worker
remittances. A telecom firm may be given generous terms for entry in the auction for radio bandwidths, but then may
consider that mobile money provision weakens its strategy and brand in that country.
Our empirical approach is to treat the two decisions as linked but separate. We therefore examine the determi-
nants of the launch of a mobile money service in a given country, conditional on the firm having already entered the
country to provide another service. Our sample of firms offering mobile money services is therefore nonrandom, be-
cause the outcome “launching a mobile money service in a country” is only observed when the outcome “entering
the country” (to open a bank subsidiary or a telco operation in that location) has also been observed. We employ a
two-step method. First, we estimate separately the determinants of entry for banking and telecom groups, using con-
ditional logit estimation methods because the observations are not independent (Greene, 2011). We perform Chi-
square tests to examine whether the coefficients on the host country variables are significantly different between the
bank and telco samples. If the coefficients are not significantly different, we conclude that the two groups of foreign
subsidiaries are attracted by similar country characteristics. This would provide reassurance that sample selection is
not biasing our results when comparing the host country determinants of the launch of mobile money between tele-
coms and bank subsidiaries.
In our second step, we compare two types of foreign firms: the foreign banks and telecom subsidiaries who
entered a given host country but did not launch a mobile money service, to the foreign banks and telecom subsidiaries
Figure 1. Geographic mapping of mobile money services in emerging and developing countries.
10 Firms restricted to the domestic economy do not make these cross-country location choices and so are excluded from
the sample in this analysis.
8 A. Pelletier et al.
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who entered the same host country and did launch a mobile money service. To that end, we use a simple logit equa-
tion with the dependent variable, launch choice, being coded as 0 when a foreign subsidiary (bank or telco) has not
launched a mobile money service and 1 when it has launched a mobile money service. In this step, we use two sub-
samples of our dataset, one composed of 109 foreign bank subsidiaries and the other composed of 157 foreign telco
subsidiaries in 90 different countries. The traditional methodology for examining the determinants of location choice
in the second step is to use a conditional logit (C-logit). In this type of model, the coefficients reflect the attractiveness
of locations to the firms in the respective samples. Thus, for every possible firm-host country dyad, the dependent
variable of investment location choice takes the value of 1 if the pertinent country is chosen by the firm, and zero for
all other countries.
For the first step, we introduce a standard set of independent variables as used to analyze foreign entry (e.g.,
Estrin et al., 2018). Thus, we follow international trade and migration research (e.g., Bernard et al., 2011; Chaney,
2014) and code geographic distance, in logs, between the most populated cities in kilometers (thousands), and
sourced from the GeoDist database made available by Mayer and Zignago (2011) (see Table A.1 in the Appendix for
a full list of variable definitions). Given the importance of language patterns in the costs factors shaping trade and in-
vestment (Rauch, 1999; Selmier and Oh, 2013), we further control for common language, a dummy variable which
takes the value of 1 if home and host countries have the same official language and 0 otherwise, using data from
CEPII. We also introduce the GDP per capita of the host economy in 2007 (World Economic Outlook, IMF) to cap-
ture levels of development and host economy labor costs; ceteris paribus, a given level of labor force skill will be less
attractive in countries with higher income per capita.
We further include population of the host country in 2007 as a standard proxy for the size of the market (Loree
and Guisinger, 1995), with data obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, introduced in
100,000 s, and using logarithms to ensure normality. Population density is also included (World Development
Indicators, 2015) since a sparser population since a sparser population may increase the demand for cheap and effi-
cient money transfer services. This is especially relevant for countries with major labor migration flows that generate
high volumes of remittances. Given its importance in our empirical discussion above, we also include a measure of
personal remittances received in the host country (as a percentage of GDP) from the World Bank Development
Indicators. Institutions have also been key in the analysis of location choice (Peng et al., 2008) so we include three
variables capturing the quality of the institutions. We introduce the polity index, which is a measure of the market-
supporting character of the political regime and ranges between 10 (total autocracy) and 10 (total democracy)
(Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). This is extracted from the Polity IV database. In
addition, to address the issue of financial development (Claessens and Laeven, 2004) we introduce an indicator of fi-
nancial freedom, measuring banking efficiency as well as independence from government control and interference in
the financial sector, and ranging from 0 (repressive) to 100 (negligible government intervention). Finally, we include
an indicator of freedom from corruption (Estrin et al., 2018), which ranges from 0 to 100. Both the latter indicators
come from the Heritage Foundation. We select all the host country variables for the year that the firm (subsidiary)
was incorporated (year of entry). We cluster the standard errors at the firm level to correct for the presence of within
cluster correlation.
In the second step equations, which we use to test Hypothesis 1, we consider only the firms that had entered a
given host country, using a logit estimation method to compare firms that launched a mobile money service to firms
that did not.
log
p
1 p
 
¼ aþXct1 þ Z
c
t1 þ d
r (1)
Where p is the probability that the event Y (launching a mobile money service) occurs, p(Y¼ 1). Xc are host coun-
try determinants capturing the strength of institutions, lagged by 1 year before launch, Zc is a vector of control varia-
bles at the country level, lagged by 1 year before launch and dr is a set of regional dummies.
In this equation, our independent variables include both variables upon which we have hypothesized and control
variables. We operationalize the former—indicating the strength of institutions in Hypothesis 1—with three measures
which the literature has identified as being critical for the provision of financial services (Claessens and Laeven, 2004;
Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). These are the strength of legal rights, the depth of credit information, and the levels of cor-
ruption. To measure the strength of legal rights, we use the World Bank’s “strength of legal rights index” (0¼weak to
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12¼ strong; World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2015). For the availability of credit information, we use the
World Bank’s ‘depth of credit information index’ (0¼ low to 8¼ high; World Bank, World Development Indicators,
2015); and to measure corruption, we use the “index of control of corruption” (2.5¼weak control to þ2.5¼ strong
control), also from the World Bank (World Bank, Worldwide Governance indicators).
Some of the factors such as the size of the market, factors underlying the costs of entry and the institutional qual-
ity, affect both the choice to enter a country and the choice to set up a mobile money service. Hence, we use as con-
trol variables some of the factors that were found to influence location choice in the first step equation, namely
population, population density, common language, distance, remittances, and financial freedom. However, the loca-
tion choice to enter is not driven by exactly the same factors as the decision to supply mobile money, and we include
some variables specific to the mobile money launch choice and whether this is undertaken by banks for telcos. The
first of these is an indicator of the size of the shadow economy (Schneider, 2012), because, as we have noted, higher
informality generally translates into fewer banked individuals and companies and this may increase the demand for
mobile moneys. The regulatory environment as it affects mobile money is also clearly an important factor in the mo-
bile money launch decision. While some countries, such as Kenya and Tanzania, have adopted an enabling legal and
regulatory approach for telecoms to provide mobile money services, others, such as Bangladesh, have favored a bank-
led approach. These regulations will determine in part whether the provision of mobile money is led by banks or by
telecoms. The GSMA has created a dummy indicator of an “enabling regulatory approach” defined as “a functional
and proportional regulatory approach that allows banks and non-bank providers to compete as well as to establish
different types of partnerships for the provision of mobile money services.” In essence, this dummy indicates to what
extent telecoms are allowed to operate in the mobile money space.11 We propose that less government control and
interference in the financial sector will be favorable to bank entry as well as to the development of bank products.
We also include the total number of mobile money providers (foreign and domestic) in a given host country 1
year before product launch. This variable, indicating the maturity and degree of competition within the mobile
money market in the host economy, might influence the decision by a potential entrant to launch a mobile money ser-
vice; more competition might deter entry. In addition, in a subsequent estimation, we decompose this measure into
four subcomponents: the total number of mobile money services provided by foreign banks, foreign telecoms, domes-
tic banks, and domestic telecoms. Finally, we include a set of regional fixed effects (sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia,
Europe/Central Asia, Latin America, Middle East/North Africa, and South Asia being the omitted dummy) to take
into account regional differences in the institutional, economic, and cultural context which may influence the diffu-
sion of mobile money.
One might also be concerned about endogeneity in this specification related to reverse causality; namely, when
banks or telecoms launch mobile money services, this will lead to an alteration of our country-level variables, in par-
ticular the institutional ones. An example might be the amendment of national regulations following the launch of
the service. We address this by lagging our right-hand side variables by 1 year before launch, for the subsidiaries who
have launched a mobile money service, to ensure that entry decisions are explained by previous levels of institutional
quality. For the subsidiaries who have not launched a mobile money service—for which the dependent variable is 0,
we use the same lagged year as the other multinational group member that has launched a mobile money service, ex-
cept when the subsidiary was set up later on, in which case we use the year of entry of this subsidiary. We also cluster
the standard errors at the destination (host country) level, allowing for potential correlations of errors across years
within a country.
3.3 Data and model specification for spillover model
To investigate spillover effects from mobile money (Hypotheses 2 and 3), we examine the relationship between vel-
ocity of money (the ratio of money stock to GDP) and the existence of mobile money services, controlling for the
other factors from the literature that are known to influence money velocity.
11 This is an important variable but it has limitations. Thus, it does not vary over time—it only indicates the state of regula-
tions in December 2014—and we do not know exactly when the regulator in each country adopted such an approach.
For some comfort, we therefore also include again the regulatory indicator of financial freedom from the Heritage
Foundation Index of Economic Freedom (2015). This variable does have a time dimension and we lag it by one year be-
fore the mobile payment service was launched to reduce the potential reverse causality.
10 A. Pelletier et al.
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This leads us to estimate the following model:
Vct ¼ MMS
c
t þ X
c
t þ c
c
þ dt þ 
c
t (2)
where Vct , the velocity in country c at time t, is calculated as the log of the ratio of Gross National Income to Broad
Money (GNI/M3) (IMF, 2015). MMSct is the number of mobile money services providers in country c at time t. X
c
t is
the vector of the economic and financial determinants of money velocity in country c at time t outlined below.
The extent of mobile money provision in each country is therefore operationalized as the total number of service
(mobile money) providers in the economy in each year. In this framework, we employ the whole sample of mobile
money providers,12 with data on the 90 countries where mobile money services have been launched and for which
we have information about the launch date. We include in our regressions a large number of other variables which
might influence the relationship between the stock of money and GDP (the velocity of money), all of which have
been included in previous quantity theory of money equations (see Friedman, 1988; Bordo and Jonung, 1990, Duck,
1993; Caruso, 2001; Pradhan and Subramanian, 2003; C¸akan and O¨zmen, 2002). These are:
i. A proxy for the state of financial innovations and of payment system technology (Bordo and Jonung, 1990),
measured by NM/M, the logarithm of [(money þ quasi money)/money] (IMF, 2015); and
ii. A measure of inflation (IMF, 2015), as higher inflation is expected to increase money velocity, everything else
constant.
We also include the logarithmic rate of change of nominal income, dY (World Bank National Accounts data), to
proxy for the nominal yields on real assets (see Friedman, 1988). This also captures the opportunity cost of holding
money and is expected to have a positive effect on money velocity. The short-term interest rate on Treasury Bills
(Treasury Bills, percent per annum; IMF, 2015) is a proxy for the opportunity cost of holding money; higher short-
term interest rates should increase money velocity (by raising the opportunity cost of holding base money). We in-
clude the risk premium on lending (IMF, 2015), which is calculated as the interest rate charged by banks on loans to
private sector customers minus the “risk free” Treasury bill interest rate at which short-term government securities
are issued or traded in the market. A higher risk premium on lending (reduced access to finance) may lead to lower
money velocity through a reduction in the circulation of money in the economy (from banks to companies) and po-
tentially also a reduction of GDP growth related to higher financing constraints for firms. We also include a govern-
ance indicator, the control of corruption. According to Bordo and Jonung (1990), improved economic security and
stability should lead to an increase in velocity. We could therefore expect a positive relation between control of cor-
ruption and money velocity. However, if higher control of corruption leads to an expansion of commercial banking
and makes the holding of bank money more desirable, then there might be a negative relation between the control of
corruption and velocity.
To address potential omitted variable bias, we introduce country fixed-effects cc to control for any missing time-
invariant country level variable. We also introduce time fixed effects, dt, to control for time trends and 
c
t is an error
term. We correct the standard errors for heteroskedasticity and cluster them at the country level. Finally, we examine
several specifications to test the robustness of our results, employing a variety of lagged independent variables to ad-
dress potential reverse causality.
4. Results
4.1 Results from the mobile money provision model
4.1.1 The determinants of host country entry
We first examine the results of the determinants of host country entry. The correlation matrix for the independent
variables on the full sample allows us to consider potential collinearities (Table 1a). For the most part, the correlation
coefficients are low, less than 0.3, which indicate that there is no serious multicollinearity issue in our estimating
sample.
12 That is, all domestic and foreign firms, and from all three categories of providers (telecom groups, banking groups, and
third party independent).
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The results of first (selection) equation, estimating the determinants of location choice using C-logit on the sample
of foreign subsidiaries (banks and telecoms) are presented in Table 1b. We report the results on the whole sample in
the first column. We find that the log of distance has a significantly negative impact on the probability to enter a
country, while a common language between home and host country increases the choice of a particular country. This
conforms to existing findings in the literature. Thus, both population and financial freedom have a significant and
positive impact on the probability to enter a country: a larger market and less financial restrictions increases the at-
tractiveness of a host country. Population density also increases the choice of a country, but it is only significant at
the 10% level. Freedom from corruption is negatively correlated with entry choice, which is contrary to expectations;
however, the coefficient is only very weakly significant (at the 10% level).
Table 1a. Correlation matrix (Obs¼ 12,173)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Financial
freedom
Freedom
from corruption
Personal
remittances
Population
density
GDP per
capita
Polity
Index
Population Distance Common
language
1 1.000
2 0.387 1.000
3 0.052 0.057 1.000
4 0.169 0.106 0.158 1.000
5 0.212 0.478 0.156 0.089 1.000
6 0.302 0.181 0.052 0.026 0.172 1.000
7 0.236 0.140 0.232 0.237 0.049 0.063 1.000
8 0.083 0.067 0.001 0.030 0.090 0.154 0.022 1.000
9 0.014 0.001 0.016 0.012 0.081 0.073 0.096 0.176 1.000
Table 1b. C-logit, determinants of location choice
Sample of foreign subsidiaries (1) (2) (3) Test difference coefficients
Chi2
Variables All Telecoms Banks [Prob >chi2]
Distance 0.673 0.633 0.667 0.04
(0.076) (0.131) (0.107) [0.841]
Common language 1.291 1.061 1.381 0.51
(0.201) (0.380) (0.241) [0.474]
GDP per capita 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.34
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) [0.560]
Population 0.144 0.002 0.176 1.26
(0.066) (0.141) (0.076) [0.262]
Population density 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.06
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) [0.807]
Polity Index 0.003 0.022 0.010 0.60
(0.018) (0.037) (0.021) [0.440]
Financial freedom 0.018 0.027 0.017 0.37
(0.007) (0.014) (0.008) [0.543]
Freedom from corruption 0.014 0.023 0.012 0.21
(0.008) (0.023) (0.009) [0.644]
Personal remittances 0.026 0.012 0.033 0.18
(0.023) (0.043) (0.027) [0.668]
Pseudo R-squared 0.116 0.163 0.105
Observations 9,538 2,443 7,095
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm (subsidiary) level.
12 A. Pelletier et al.
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We then split the sample into two subgroups—telecoms and banks—to see if the determinants are sensitive to the
sector. We find that distance decreases the choice of a country for both banks and telecoms and the coefficients are
very similar (0.633 for telecoms and 0.667 for banks). In fact, the Chi2 shows that the difference in coefficient be-
tween both groups is not significant. Common language positively and significantly affects entry choice for both
groups, but the coefficient is larger for telecoms than for banks (1.061 for telecoms, 1.381 for banks) though the
Chi2 indicates that the difference is not significant. Population enters positively and significantly, the model in the
bank subsample, but the coefficient is negative and not significant in the telecoms subsample. In fact, the Chi2, at
1.26, reveals that the difference is not also significant between both coefficients. Financial freedom attracts both tele-
com groups and banking groups, and the coefficient is significant at the 5% level for banks (it is only significant at
the 10% for telecom groups), and the results of the Chi2 test indicates that the difference between both coefficients is
not statistically significant. None of the other variables (GDP per capita, population density, polity index, freedom
from corruption, and personal remittances) is significantly different in the two subsamples.
Overall, the results of this analysis of the determinants of host country entry for banks and telecoms show that
the two sectors do not differ greatly in the factors that motivate their country location decisions. This provides some
reassurance that self-selection issues with regard to host country entry should not bias our analysis of the decision to
launch a mobile money service, conditional upon the decision to enter, in the second stage of our estimation.
4.1.2 Determinants of mobile money launch and tests of hypothesis 1
The correlation matrix for the variables in the second stage logit equation determining the provision of mobile money
is presented in Table 2a. Almost all the coefficients are relatively low, below 0.30, with the exception of the total
number of mobile money provided by foreign banks, which has a coefficient of correlation of 0.581 with the total
number of mobile money provided by domestic banks.
In Table 2b, we report the results of our logit estimation of mobile money service launch. In the first column, we
report estimates based on the whole sample. We find that the strength of legal rights decreases the probability of mo-
bile money launch; the coefficient is negative and significant at the 5% level. The odds ratio is 0.79, meaning that a
one unit increases in the strength of legal rights decreases the odds of launching a mobile money service by 21%. One
interpretation of this result is that in countries with weak legal rights, financial systems are underdeveloped and the
need for mobile money services is high. In other words, weak legal rights increase the business case for fast and cheap
mobile money services. Interestingly the distance between the host and home country is positive and significant in the
whole sample, although distance traditionally deters foreign investments. This might reflect the possibility that the
decision to launch mobile money is grounded in local factors, once a company has entered a country, and not by
home country factors. The control of corruption has a positive effect but it is only significant at the 10% level.
However, as we will see in the split samples, this is the result of opposite effects of corruption for telecoms and
groups. The size of the shadow economy also has a positive effect but this is only very weakly significant (at the 10%
level). Informality also increases the need for mobile money services, presumably due to the unavailability of formal
transfer services through the banking system. The other variables are not significant; however, we will see that some
become significant when we split the sample into banks and telecom to test our hypothesis.
Column (2) reports the results of the logit estimation on the sample of foreign telecom subsidiaries and Column
(3) reports the results of this estimation on the sample of foreign bank subsidiaries. Our hypothesis test relies on the
difference between the estimated coefficients on legal rights, credit information, and corruption between Columns
(2) and (3). Taken together, the coefficients on the three proxies for the levels of institutional voids provide some
clear support for Hypothesis 1. The results indicate that telecom groups are more likely to launch mobile money in
countries where credit information is limited. The coefficient is negative and significant at the 5% level in the
telecom-led sample, while it is positive, but nonsignificant in the bank-led sample. The Chi2 test confirms that the dif-
ference in the coefficients is statistically significant (5% level). Moreover, banking groups are more likely to launch a
mobile money product in countries with low corruption (high control of corruption), and the difference in the coeffi-
cients between the banking groups and telecom groups samples is also statistically significant. Further, we find a
negative relation between the strength of legal rights index and mobile money providers’ entry in both the telco and
bank samples though the coefficient is lower for banks and both coefficients are nonsignificant. However, the Chi2
test does not support the view that the difference between these two coefficients is statistically significant.
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Table 2a. Correlation matrix (Obs¼ 173)
Strength of legal
rights index
Depth of
credit infor-
mation
index
Control of
Corruption
Distance Common
language
Population
density
Population Financial
freedom
Size of the
shadow
economy
Personal
remittances
Enabling
mobile
money
regulatory
approach
tot number
of mobile
money
services
provided by
foreign
banks
tot number
of mobile
money
services
provided by
domestic
banks
tot number
of mobile
money
services
provided by
foreign
telecoms
tot number
of mobile
money
services
provided by
domestic
telecoms
1 1.000
2 0.237 1.000
3 0.059 0.313 1.000
4 0.022 0.153 0.093 1.000
5 0.061 0.132 0.271 0.088 1.000
6 0.161 0.073 0.097 0.075 0.195 1.000
7 0.204 0.063 0.273 0.197 0.329 0.280 1.000
8 0.068 0.211 0.277 0.029 0.025 0.296 0.155 1.000
9 0.142 0.196 0.214 0.004 0.025 0.149 0.132 0.075 1.000
10 0.057 0.016 0.053 0.191 0.041 0.170 0.194 0.084 0.065 1.000
11 0.018 0.187 0.038 0.016 0.143 0.239 0.318 0.054 0.208 0.084 1.000
12 0.196 0.178 0.069 0.077 0.174 0.024 0.071 0.084 0.164 0.216 0.059 1.000
13 0.262 0.117 0.150 0.006 0.123 0.096 0.379 0.049 0.047 0.085 0.217 0.581 1.000
14 0.195 0.275 0.156 0.107 0.047 0.078 0.038 0.086 0.127 0.035 0.139 0.034 0.008 1.000
15 0.204 0.066 0.081 0.120 0.081 0.095 0.338 0.010 0.262 0.080 0.011 0.088 0.231 0.001 1.000
1
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Turning to the control variables, they largely conform to expectations. An indicator of proximity, common lan-
guage between host and home countries, has a positive and significant coefficient at the 5% level for banks and a
negative but not significant one for telcos though geographic distance is not significant in either of the two subsam-
ples. The size of the shadow economy increases the probability of banks launching mobile money, with the coefficient
being significant at the 1% level. The odds ratio for this variable is 1.16, meaning that a one percentage point in-
crease in informality (calculated as a percentage of GDP) increases the odds of foreign banks subsidiaries launching a
mobile money service by 16%. However, this coefficient is not significant in the telecom sample. The difference be-
tween the two coefficients is significant at the 1% level. This is an interesting result given that we would have
expected banks to be reluctant to launch these services in economies with large informal markets. However, it is also
possible that banks seize the opportunity offered by mobile money to capture part of these informal cash flows, while
telecoms are not driven by these factors because they do not differentiate their market between formal and informal
actors.
The scale of remittances in an economy is also found to be an important determinant of mobile money launch; it
increases the probability of banks to offer mobile money and the coefficient is significant at the 5% level. A one-
percentage point increase in personal remittances received increases the odds of banks launching a mobile money ser-
vice by 25%. However, the coefficient on personal remittances is not significant for telecoms though the difference
between the coefficients in the bank and telecom sample is not significant. One explanation for this result is that
banks are more likely than telecoms to be able to offer international remittances services, given that they have a
Table 2b. Logit of mobile money service launch (1/2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
T-test difference coefficients
Variables All Telecoms Banks [Prob>Chi2]
Strength of legal rights index 0.232 0.587 0.160 0.87
(0.111) (0.372) (0.292) [0.351]
Depth of credit information index 0.174 0.168 1.025 3.68
(0.114) (0.173) (0.595) [0.055]
Control of corruption 0.703 1.182 2.868 9.31
(0.411) (0.482) (1.281) [0.002]
Distance 0.605 0.049 0.514 0.51
(0.283) (0.437) (0.671) [0.473]
Common language 0.314 0.927 2.042 6.46
(0.391) (0.728) (0.885) [0.011]
Population density 0.000 0.002 0.009 1.72
(0.001) (0.002) (0.008) [0.190]
Population 0.155 0.347 1.120 1.30
(0.191) (0.345) (1.134) [0.254]
Financial freedom 0.016 0.034 0.070 3.63
(0.013) (0.031) (0.044) [0.057]
Size of the shadow economy 0.027 0.053 0.147 7.78
(0.016) (0.042) (0.054) [0.005]
Personal remittances 0.036 0.002 0.225 2.53
(0.027) (0.083) (0.102) [0.111]
Enabling mobile money regulatory approach 0.251 0.619 1.931 1.18
(0.341) (0.680) (0.926) [0.277]
Tot number of mobile money providers in host country 0.023 0.047 0.526 3.62
(0.092) (0.153) (0.264) [0.057]
Pseudo R-squared 0.133 0.392 0.410
Observations 163 109 46
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the host country level. Regional fixed effects included. We have tried to add additional controls for both
telecommunication infrastructure and banking infrastructure. However, where we could add variables, the results remained the same and in cases where, because of
high correlations or missing data we could not, we opted to retain the current specifications.
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9
banking license, and as a result, are better able and more interested in taping into this market by providing mobile
money.
We suggested that regulation would be an important factor for mobile money launch, and we find as expected
that banks are less likely to launch mobile money when the regulator allows telecoms to operate in the mobile money
space. Given that telecom groups are usually very efficient in offering these products thanks to their large retail net-
work, the strength of the competition from these groups might deter banks to launch mobile money. That said, the
coefficient is not statistically different between the two samples. Finally, the number of existing mobile money pro-
viders in an economy (including domestic/foreign and telecom and banks) has a positive impact on the probability of
foreign banks subsidiaries launching mobile money but has no significant impact for telecoms. The difference be-
tween both coefficients is only significant at the 10% level. This might be because telecom groups have tended to be
pioneers in this field and therefore it might be less likely for banks to launch mobile money unless this has occurred.
This would explain the positive coefficient on this variable.
To explore this issue further, in Table 2c, we decompose this measure of the total number of mobile money pro-
viders in an economy in a given year into its four subcomponents: mobile money provided by foreign banks, domestic
banks, foreign telecoms, and domestic telecoms (all lagged by 1 year). The results on the other variables are similar
to what we obtained in Table 2b. The first observation is that the coefficient on mobile money provided by foreign
banks and mobile money provided by domestic banks are either significantly negative (foreign banks) or positive (do-
mestic banks) across the three samples (whole and the two split samples). The coefficients on mobile money provided
by foreign telecoms and domestic telecom are significant in none of the samples. One explanation for this result is
that, though previous foreign bank entrants may deter firms from launching mobile money, a large number of domes-
tic bank entrants may signal high profits and therefore attract their entry. This would imply that foreign bank
entrants have ownership advantages that make them more than competitive against domestic bank suppliers.
However, potential entrants are neither attracted nor deterred by telecom suppliers, whether foreign or domestic,
perhaps because they are seen as offering a more differentiated product.
4.2 The economic impact of mobile money: hypotheses 2 and 3
We examine in Table 3 the estimates of the model linking money velocity with mobile money. We report estimates of
two different specifications; a restricted model and one with the full set of controls. The latter, reported in Models
(2)–(4)–(6), provide a framework similar to the literature; however, the sample size is reduced by a factor of almost
3, due to the lack of availability of financial variables for a few countries and years in the sample. Hence, we also re-
port a reduced version of the set of control variables, using only three control variables (NM/M, inflation, and dY),
in Models (1)–(3)–(5). In each specification, we include three variants of the lag structure to allow for the likelihood
that the impact of money on GDP is not instantaneous, giving six models in total. In the baseline estimations, Models
(1) and (2), the left-hand side variables are contemporaneous to our dependent variables (i.e., no lag). In the remain-
ing columns, we re-estimate with lags of 1 year [Models (3) and (4)] and 2 years [Models (5) and (6)], to control for
potential reverse causality and lagged effect of mobile money on GDP.
Overall, we identify a significant positive relationship between the total number of mobile money providers at t,
t-1, and t-2 and money velocity at time t, with p-values of the coefficients ranging from 0.01 to 0.04, depending on
the model. Thus, these regressions provide the first empirical evidence that mobile money has positive benefits for the
broader economic environment, by stimulating increased business activity in the economy as a whole and provide
support for Hypothesis 2.
The result is robust.13 In the sense that the magnitude of the coefficient on mobile money does not change when
the additional controls are included. The coefficients on the control variables also largely conform to expectations.
Financial innovations (NM/M) are positively associated with velocity, as found empirically by Caruso (2001). The
coefficient on dY, which proxies nominal yields on real assets, is also significantly positive (coefficient¼ 0.34 and
p-value¼ 0.00 in Model 1), which is conform to the theoretical (Friedman, 1988) and empirical (Caruso, 2001) lit-
erature. We find that velocity is lower in less corrupt countries. This could reflect the fact that commercial banking is
13 The R-squared are very high (ranging between 0.94 and 0.96) due to the inclusion of year-fixed effects and country-
fixed effects. Without fixed effects, the R2 is 0.45 in Model 1 and 0.67 in Model 2.
16 A. Pelletier et al.
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more diffused in countries with lower corruption, leading to a more rapid growth in the demand for money than in
nominal income, and consequently to a downward trend in velocity (Bordo and Jonung, 1990).
We further explored the robustness of our results by testing the effects of using alternative measures of the velocity
of money. We re-estimated the full model of Table 3, Column (2) using the following alternative measures of the vel-
ocity of money: GNI/M2, GNI/M1, GDP/M3, GDP/M2, and GDP/M1. The coefficients on the total number of mo-
bile money providers in the economy in a given year remained positive and significant at the 5% confidence level in
all these alternative regressions and we do not report them here. The magnitude of the coefficients also did not
change greatly, from 0.021 to 0.025. We also examined an alternative way to treat the standard errors. In the
reported regressions, we use robust standard errors clustered by country, to take into account potential within-
country correlation of errors over time, also called “Rogers standard errors.”14 We explored the use of Newey-West
standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity and for autocorrelation in the panel (AR-1).15 The results with the
Table 2c. Logit of mobile money service launch (2/2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
T-test difference Chi2
Variables All Telecoms Banks [prob>Chi2]
Strength of legal rights index 0.226 0.758 0.332 0.49
(0.131) (0.550) (0.241) [0.483]
Depth of credit information index 0.171 0.294 3.285 4.14
(0.120) (0.256) (1.745) [0.042]
Control of corruption 0.908 0.804 3.184 1.80
(0.442) (0.637) (2.954) [0.180]
Distance 0.701 0.123 2.461 1.61
(0.279) (0.548) (1.820) [0.205]
Common language 0.545 2.126 3.394 5.93
(0.432) (0.943) (2.057) [0.015]
Population density 0.001 0.002 0.030 1.58
(0.001) (0.002) (0.026) [0.209]
Population 0.166 0.503 3.585 2.96
(0.211) (0.462) (2.282) [0.086]
Financial freedom 0.007 0.014 0.064 0.31
(0.015) (0.039) (0.081) [0.578]
Size of the shadow economy 0.024 0.057 0.201 5.26
(0.022) (0.056) (0.095) [0.022]
Personal remittances 0.105 0.151 0.658 2.44
(0.049) (0.095) (0.300) [0.118]
Enabling mobile money regulatory approach 0.025 0.187 1.600 1.55
(0.388) (0.620) (0.827) [0.213]
Tot nb of mobile money services provided by foreign banks 3.000 5.663 3.336 1.45
(0.741) (1.508) (1.215) [0.229]
Tot nb of mobile money services provided by domestic banks 2.106 3.322 6.588 1.15
(0.491) (1.079) (2.785) [0.283]
Tot nb of mobile money services provided by foreign telecoms 0.183 0.169 0.076 0.08
(0.202) (0.515) (0.642) [0.783]
Tot nb of mobile money services provided by domestic telecoms 0.371 0.165
(0.314) (0.495)
Pseudo R-squared 0.207 0.470 0.579
Observations 163 109 41
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the host country level. Regional fixed effects included.
14 White standard errors adjusted to account for possible correlation within a cluster.
15 We use the xtpcse command in Stata.
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Table 3. Impact of mobile money on velocity of money
Money velocity (GNI/M3), c, t
Baseline models With one lag With two lags
Variables (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) (Model 6)
Total number of mobile money providers, c, t 0.025 0.025
(0.007) (0.010)
NM/M, log, c, t 0.483 0.567
(0.087) (0.155)
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %), c, t 0.001 0.003
(0.001) (0.003)
dY, c, t 0.343 0.552
(0.097) (0.114)
Treasury bills, percent per annum, c, t 0.005
(0.004)
Risk premium on lending, c, t 0.001
(0.004)
Control of corruption, c, t 0.134
(0.064)
Total number of mobile money providers, c, t-1 0.022 0.022
(0.008) (0.010)
NM/M, log, c, t-1 0.303 0.335
(0.064) (0.100)
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %), c, t-1 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.003)
dY, c, t-1 0.103 0.320
(0.118) (0.142)
Treasury bills, percent per annum, c, t-1 0.004
(0.004)
Risk premium on lending, c, t-1 0.002
(0.003)
Control of corruption, c, t-1 0.222
(0.076)
Total number of mobile money providers, c, t-2 0.025 0.031
(0.012) (0.014)
NM/M, log, c, t-2 0.240 0.273
(0.069) (0.107)
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %), c, t-2 0.002 0.000
(0.000) (0.003)
dY, c, t-2 0.043 0.255
(0.094) (0.123)
Treasury bills, percent per annum, c, t-2 0.006
(0.004)
Risk premium on lending, c, t-2 0.001
(0.003)
Control of corruption, c, t-2 0.134
(0.070)
Observations 1,017 376 1,005 398 920 363
R-squared 0.942 0.963 0.940 0.956 0.942 0.955
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level.
18 A. Pelletier et al.
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Newey-West standard errors were very similar to those with the Rogers standard error. Re-estimating the model in
Table 3, Column (2), we obtained a coefficient on mobile money providers of 0.0241 and a standard error of 0.0097.
We chose to report the Rogers standard errors as they have been found to be unbiased in the presence of a firm effect
(e.g., the observations of a firm in different years are correlated), (here country effect), while the Newey-West stand-
ard errors modified for panel data tend to have a small bias (see Petersen, 2005).
Hypothesis 3 asked whether the effects of mobile money on the volume of transactions and growth in the econ-
omy as a whole are sensitive to the channel through which mobile money is provided; banks or telecoms. To test this,
we extend the model to include separately the total number of mobile money services launched by telecom groups
and banking groups at time t and t-1.16 Thus in Table 4 we report results from estimations of models similar to those
reported in Table 3, but with the entry of mobile money providers now separated into entry by telcos in Columns (1)
and (3) and entry by banks in Columns (2) and (4), respectively.17 We consider the specification with no lag
[Columns (1) and (2)] and one lag [Columns (3) and (4)].
The regressions are very similar to those reported in Table 3 in terms of the magnitude and size of the coefficients
on the control variables, but there are differences regarding the coefficients on the separate impacts of telco and bank
mobile money entry on the velocity of money. We find a positive and significant effect for banking groups, with p-
values of 0.00 in both Model 2 and Model 4. However, we do not identify any significant relationship between the
scale of mobile money provision by telecoms and the velocity of money: the coefficient has p-values of 0.94 in Model
1 and 0.93 in Model 3. This suggests that the positive effect of the larger provision of mobile money services on the
volume of transactions in an economy is stronger for services launched by banking groups than those by telecom
companies, providing support for Hypothesis 3. We conclude that the impact of mobile money on the macro-
economy is greater for banks than for telcos.
5. Conclusions
5.1 Interpreting the findings
Mobile money is an example of a disruptive innovation in the financial services sector in developing economies with
opportunities for rapid business growth across a variety of potential suppliers as well as for broader market and eco-
nomic development. To gain a clearer understanding of the phenomena, we have explored in depth the factors deter-
mining the channels of mobile money provision in different institutional contexts, as well as the impact of mobile
money provision by banks and telcos on the broader economy.
Mobile money has so far been an innovation of primary relevance to developing rather than developed economies,
relying on the large penetration of cheaper technology (basic mobile phones or cheap smartphones) to facilitate new
market transactions that did not previously occur because of high transaction costs. However, there remains a great
deal of heterogeneity in its pace and scale of adoption, notably concerning the channels by which mobile money serv-
ices are delivered. This led us to explore whether the form of entry of mobile money providers is conditioned by the
institutional characteristics of the host economies. We find that the critical elements of local context leading telecom
companies to offer mobile money are different to those for banks, in some cases being diametrically opposed. Thus,
the control of corruption was found to be a significant determinant of banks’ provision of mobile money. Converting
the coefficients from Table 2b, Models (2) and (3), into relative-risk ratios, we find that a one-unit increase in the
control of corruption, given entry, increases the “relative risk” of banks offering relative to not offering a mobile
money service by a factor of 4.01. In contrast, control of corruption decreases this relative risk for telecom companies
by a factor of 0.66.
Why do we observe these differences in the impact of contextual factors? Consider first the telecom groups. We
argued above that their capabilities and assets made it easier for them than for banks to enter institutionally weak
environments, where the frictional transaction costs hindering the emergence of financial markets are greater. Thus,
we find that for telecoms, a one-point increase in their most important driver, the legal rights index, decreases the
16 We also tested for t-2 in the restricted model [cf., Models (1), (3), and (5) of Table 6]. The results were qualitatively
similar. We do not report them here for the sake of brevity.
17 We also estimated the short model including only NM/M, inflation and dY as controls. The results were qualitatively
similar so we preferred to report the model with additional controls, even if it implies a reduced sample size.
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relative risk of offering a mobile money service (given entry) by 0.69. As the institutional environments improve, the
likelihood that telecoms choose to offer mobile money services decreases. Likewise, a one-point increase in the credit
information index will decrease the likelihood by 0.77. The relative risk ratios of legal rights and credit information
are, respectively, 0.97 and 1.26 for banks, but the coefficient is not significant. For telecom companies, mobile money
provision allows them to exploit their greater strategic flexibility to operate in weaker institutional environments and
therefore to reach potential clients who are poorer and more likely to be excluded from financial service markets.
Our analysis of the impact of mobile money is one of the first to identify positive significant spillover effects from
mobile money to the broader economy. Thus, we found that the velocity of money is positively related to the number
of providers of mobile money, in a model that controlled for all the standard explanatory factors. This finding was
significant in a contemporaneous specification and for up to two lags, and is robust across alternative measures of
money velocity. The impact of mobile money on the economy as a whole in our empirical study is found to be large;
Table 4. Differential impact of mobile money via telecoms and banks on velocity of money
Money velocity (GNI/M3), c, t
Variables (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4)
Total number of mobile money services launched by Telecoms, c, t 0.002
(0.025)
Total number of mobile money services launched by Banks, c, t 0.064
(0.018)
NM/M, log, c, t 0.551 0.584
(0.159) (0.156)
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %), c, t 0.004 0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
dY, c, t 0.512 0.543
(0.090) (0.111)
Treasury bills, percent per annum, c, t 0.006 0.006
(0.004) (0.004)
Risk premium on lending, c, t 0.001 0.000
(0.004) (0.004)
Control of Corruption, c, t 0.151 0.142
(0.071) (0.064)
Total number of mobile money services launched by Telecoms, c, t-1 0.002
(0.025)
Total number of mobile money services launched by Banks, c, t-1 0.062
(0.015)
NM/M, log, c, t-1 0.330 0.358
(0.106) (0.102)
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %), c, t-1 0.000 0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
dY, c, t-1 0.282 0.314
(0.134) (0.143)
Treasury bills, percent per annum, c, t-1 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.003)
Risk premium on lending, c, t-1 0.002 0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
Control of corruption, c, t-1 0.238 0.227
(0.085) (0.074)
Observations 376 376 398 398
R-squared 0.961 0.963 0.954 0.956
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level.
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an additional mobile money service launched in an economy is associated with a 2.2% to 3.1% increase in money
velocity, depending on the specification. Assuming no change in the stock of money as a consequence, a plausible as-
sumption because monetary policy is rarely set with reference to technological developments in the financial sector,
mobile money will be having a large expansionary effect on GDP. To our knowledge, this is the first time such an ef-
fect has been shown.
Given our previous finding about the contextual drivers of mobile money channels, we wanted also to explore
whether banking and telecom groups differ in terms of their broader economic effects. We found that the impact of
mobile money provision on the velocity of money is driven by banks, but not by telecoms. We interpret this to be a
consequence of the fact that telecoms cannot intermediate by making further loans to borrowers based on the mobile
money deposits that they have accepted. In contrast, banks can use mobile money deposits to create additional
money, thereby altering the velocity of money.18
Thus, the same characteristics that allow telcos to enter riskier and institutionally more challenging contexts also
imply that their impact on the broader economy through financial intermediation is more limited. We saw that the
effects of telco based mobile money provision on GDP are not significant. In contrast, the impact of banks-led mobile
money services is positive and significant because their mobile money model builds and extends traditional banking
into new mobile channels.
5.2 Limitations
Even though we constructed a novel, longitudinal dataset, our empirical efforts suffer from limitations stemming
from the availability of data. The GSMA only provides information on the mobile money services that are currently
available. In other words, we do not know which providers have exited the sector, merged or been acquired. This
means that our estimations suffer from survivors’ bias; the determinants of product launch that we modeled may re-
flect the behavior of larger, survivor, companies, but not necessarily that of the firms that have exited the market.
Moreover, our results for the income velocity of money may be overstated because our measure of the number of mo-
bile money providers in each year for each country was based on the mobile money providers that still existed in
2015. Further to that, we would have ideally directly captured the extent of mobile money activity and diffusion by
using data on the number of transactions or number of active mobile money users, instead of data on the number of
mobile money providers in each country in each year. Unfortunately, such data on transactions or mobile money
accounts are not available on a consistent basis across years and countries.
In addition, we suffer from data limitations at the company level, especially concerning measures of productivity
or revenues such as the number of subscribers for each organization, the volume or value of mobile money transac-
tions and service costs for each organization. As a result, we have not been able to examine directly firms’ perform-
ance in the mobile money sphere. Such information is difficult to come by, especially on a comparable basis, both
across countries and across companies, in particular because different providers belong to different industrial sectors.
Given the lack of published data both by the companies and by the regulator, firm surveys seem to be at this stage the
way forward to gather such data.
5.3 Policy implications
We have identified in the spread of mobile money across developing countries, a feedback loop between the institu-
tional environment; the sector in which the firm is based and the broader economic effects generated. The environ-
ment determines to a certain extent which organization will dominate the provision of mobile money when there are
competing organizational forms. This then determines which products are available within this given service. The
range of products available may also ultimately re-shapes the economic context, via their impact on the mode and
frequency of transactions. Little previous attention has been paid to how firm capabilities and sectoral technological
differences can influence firms’ ability to exploit technological innovations in contexts with missing institutions.
We have found that neither banks nor telcos provide an unambiguously superior business model for the introduc-
tion of mobile money in developing countries. Rather, the advantages of each depends upon the institutional context
18 To the extent that they are required to deposit customers’ funds in a bank however, the value stored as e-money will
lead to money creation if this bank then provides loans to borrowers with the deposits they have accepted (di Castri
2013).
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of the host economy. Because they are largely cross-selling within their existing network of agents, telcos can reach
more cheaply a large market of financially excluded individuals and firms and if the mobile network has already
been built, they need to sink less into the creation of a new supporting infrastructure. Moreover, they typically face
less prudential regulation than banks and, because their offerings are largely restricted to transactions products, they
bear fewer risks from a given volume of business. Hence, they are better positioned to navigate the complexities of
countries in which missing institutions are more pronounced.
The balance of advantage and disadvantage in opening a mobile money system is rather different for banks. They
usually need to build up a new structure of agents in order to reach the financially excluded, often in locations with
which they are not familiar. They also face greater levels of regulation of their business activities. Thus, the transac-
tions costs of entry into mobile money in developing countries remain higher for them than for telcos. Hence, they
may be unwilling or unable to operate profitably in some contexts in which missing markets are highly prevalent be-
cause the returns for them do not exceed the transactions costs. This may contrast with telcos, which may be able to
operate in these higher transactions cost locations. Thus, policy makers seeking rapid development of mobile money
in challenging institutional environments might focus on telcos.
However, we have also found that mobile money systems based on telcos may have less impact on the process of
economic development than those based on banks. Our comparison of the capabilities and technologies of firms in
each sector explains why. Telcos may reduce the transactions costs for individuals and firms to do business, but they
typically do not offer a wide range of products and their activities usually do not stimulate a money multiplier.
Hence, their impact is real and spreads quickly but is more limited. For policy-makers in areas where banks are able
and willing to extend their activities to mobile money, for example where institutions are of better quality, encourag-
ing banks to do so may be a good long-term strategy to follow. In areas that are institutionally more challenging, tel-
cos offer the more promising route, but governments need to consider in the longer term how to extend the benefits
for the economy as a whole. One way might be by further encouraging partnerships between banks and telcos in the
provision of additional mobile money products, such as micro-loan (cf., MShwari in Kenya).
This analysis also has implications for policy-makers because of the role of regulations in shaping the way that
the provision of banking services, including MP, evolves. In the particular context of finance for the unbanked, if
local incentives are not strong enough for banks to develop and launch these products and telcos are excluded, mo-
bile money may not get off the ground. In such cases, enabling regulations for alternative organizations, such as tele-
com groups, may be a better strategy for policy-makers.
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Appendix
Table A.1. Variables definition
Variable name Variable definition Source
Distance Geographic distance, in logs, between the most populated cities in
kilometers (thousands)
GeoDist database made available
by Mayer and Zignago (2011)
Common language Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if home and host coun-
tries have the same official language and 0 otherwise
CEPII
GDP per capita GDP per capita of the host economy in 2007 World Economic Outlook, IMF
Population Population of the host country in 2007, introduced in 100,000s,
and using logarithms to ensure normality
World Bank, World
Development Indicators
Population density Density of population, people per sq. km of land area World Bank, World
Development Indicators
Polity index Measure of the market-supporting character of the political regime
and ranges between 10 (total autocracy) and 10 (total
democracy)
Polity IV database
Financial freedom Indicator of financial freedom, measuring banking efficiency as
well as independence from government control and interference
in the financial sector, and ranging from 0 (repressive) to 100
(negligible government intervention).
Heritage Foundation
Freedom from
corruption
Freedom from corruption, which ranges from 0 to 100 Heritage Foundation
Personal remittances Personal remittances received in the host country (as a percentage
of GDP)
World Bank, World
Development Indicators
Strength of legal
rights index
Strength of legal rights index measures the degree to which collat-
eral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and
lenders and thus facilitate lending. The index ranges from 0 to
12, with higher scores indicating that these laws are better
designed to expand access to credit.
World Bank, World
Development Indicators
Depth of credit infor-
mation index
Depth of credit information index measures rules affecting the
scope, accessibility, and quality of credit information available
through public or private credit registries. The index ranges
from 0 to 8, with higher values indicating the availability of
more credit information, from either a public registry or a pri-
vate bureau, to facilitate lending decisions.
World Bank, World
Development Indicators
Control of
Corruption
Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty
and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state
by elites and private interests. Estimate gives the country’s score
on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distri-
bution, i.e., ranging from approximately 2.5 to 2.5
World Bank, World
Development Indicators
Size of the shadow
economy
Measures productive economic activities that would normally be
included in the national accounts but which remain under-
ground due to tax or regulatory burdens
Schneider (2012)
Enabling mobile
money regulatory
approach
Dummy which indicates to what extent telecoms are allowed to
operate in the mobile money space (enabling ¼ 1)
GSMA
tot number of mobile
money services pro-
vided by foreign
banks
Total number of mobile money services provided by foreign banks GSMA
(continued)
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Table A.1. Continued
Variable name Variable definition Source
tot number of mobile
money services pro-
vided by domestic
banks
Total number of mobile money services provided by domestic
banks
GSMA
tot number of mobile
money services pro-
vided by foreign
telecoms
Total number of mobile money services provided by foreign
telecoms
GSMA
tot number of mobile
money services pro-
vided by domestic
telecoms
Total number of mobile money services provided by domestic
telecoms
GSMA
Money Velocity
(GNI/M3), c, t
Velocity, in country c at time t, is calculated as the log of the ratio
of Gross National Income to Broad Money (GNI/M3)
International Monetary Fund,
International Financial
Statistics
Total number of mo-
bile money pro-
viders, c, t
Total number of mobile money providers in country c at time t GSMA
Total number of mo-
bile money services
launched by
Telecoms, c, t
Total number of mobile money services launched by Telecoms in
country c at time t
GSMA
Total number of mo-
bile money services
launched by Banks,
c, t
Total number of mobile money services launched by Banks in
country c at time t
GSMA
NM/M, log, c, t Logarithm of [(money þ quasi money)/money] International Monetary Fund,
International Financial
Statistics
Inflation, consumer
prices (annual %),
c, t
Inflation rate, average consumer prices, annual percent change International Monetary Fund,
International Financial
Statistics
dY, c, t Logarithmic rate of change of nominal income, dY World Bank National Accounts
data
Treasury Bills, percent
per annum, c, t
Treasury bills, percent per annum International Monetary Fund,
International Financial
Statistics
Risk premium on
lending, c, t
Risk premium on lending, calculated as the interest rate charged by
banks on loans to private sector customers minus the “risk free”
Treasury bill interest rate at which short-term government secur-
ities are issued or traded in the market
International Monetary Fund,
International Financial
Statistics
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